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Abstract. When multiple items are auctioned sequentially, the ordering
of auctions plays an important role in the total revenue collected by
the auctioneer. This is true especially with budget constrained bidders
and the presence of complementarities among items. In such sequential
auction settings, it is difficult to develop efficient algorithms for finding an
optimal sequence of items that optimizes the revenue of the auctioneer.
However, when historical data are available, it is possible to learn a model
in order to predict the outcome of a given sequence. In this work, we show
how to construct such a model, and provide methods that finds a good
sequence for a new set of items given the learned model. We develop
an auction simulator and design several experiment settings to test the
performance of the proposed methods.
Keywords: Sequential auctions, revenue maximization, learning, experimenta-
tion
1 Introduction
Auctions are becoming increasingly popular for allocating resources or items in
business-to-business and business-to-customer markets. Various auction formats
exist, such as combinatorial auction where agents submit bids with item bun-
dles [19], and sequential auctions where items are sold consecutively to agents [3].
Often sequential auctions are adopted in practice, especially when the number
of items for sale is large (cf. the Dutch flower auction [21]), and when the buyers
enter and leave the auction dynamically (cf. online auctions [15]).
In many situations, agents desire items with complementarities. For exam-
ple, in the resource allocation auctions [3], obtaining one resource (i.e., a truck)
without another resource (i.e., fuel) makes the first resource worthless. In ad-
dition, bidders often have budget or capacity constraints, as often seen in in-
dustrial procurement [11], or in FCC spectrum auctions, where it is found to
be realistic to assume that all personal communicating services firms are budget
constrained [6].
More and more auctions nowadays utilize information technology. For exam-
ple, the Aalsmeer flower auction [10] is converting the traditional flower auction,
where buyers need to be present in the auction room, to a modern remote mar-
ket place, where buyers can remotely place bids directly from all over the world.
Increasingly popular online auctions are conducted using computers. The use of
information technology makes it possible to automatically store detailed infor-
mation about bidding data. This auction information provides the auctioneer
the possibility to analyze the past auctions in order to gain insights into bid-
ders’ behaviors and their preferences over the auctioned resources or items. Such
valuable information could support the auctioneer to manage future auctions.
In this paper we study how the earlier auction information can be used
for the auctioneer to solve one managerial problem in sequential auctions—the
auctioning sequence for the given set of items. Previous research has shown the
revenue is heavily dependent on the ordering of items especially when bidders
have budget constraints [16, 9] or when they have preference over bundles of
items [20]. We use the following two examples to intuitively demonstrate the
importance of ordering on the expected revenue even when bidders are truth
telling. Our first example considers budget constrained bidders.
Example 1. Two agents A1 and A2 take part in a sequential auction of resources.
For sale are resource r1 and resource r2. The value of these resources for the
agents are given as follows: vA1(r1) = 5, vA1(r2) = 5, vA2(r2) = 4. In addition,
both agent A1 and A2 have a budget limit of 5. Consider one situation where the
auctioneer orders the items first r1 and then r2. In this case A1 will get r1 with
price 5, and then A2 will win r2 as A1 has no money left. The total revenue is
9. However, if r2 is auctioned before r1, A1 will win r2 with price 5, and r1 will
not be sold since A2 is not interested in it. In this situation, the total revenue
collected becomes 5.
In the second example, agents desire items with complementarities.
Example 2. Suppose given r1 and r2, agent A2 only desires r2 with value 5. A1
has complementary items, i.e., A1 values r1 and r2 with 1 and 1 respectively if he
wins only r1 or r2 at the end of the auction, however, if he wins both resources
r1 and r2, the value v(r1∪ r2) goes up to 10. It is quite obvious that in this case,
the auctioneer should sell r1 first as it will end up with revenue 10, in contrast
to 6 if r2 is sold first.
Much of the existing work that studies optimal ordering in auctions focuses on
theoretical analysis on bidders’ strategy [8, 20] and conditions when the optimal
ordering exits [9, 16, 20]. However, it is difficult to apply these results to actual
auctions as they rely on strong assumptions which rarely hold in practice. In
this paper, we develop a novel method for finding revenue-maximizing orderings
that can generalize to real-world auctions.
Unlike existing work, our method is based on techniques from machine learn-
ing. It uses historical auction data in order to quickly learn which orderings
have high expected revenue. Since many auctions, such as online auctions and
the Dutch flower auctions are held regularly, where the same types of items are
auctioned repeatedly, such data is readily available.
We briefly describe the auction setting as follows. There are a set of private
value items for sale in a sequential auction. There are a set of budget-constrained
bidders, with unknown valuation functions. Bidders may desire more than one
item, and some of them may prefer item bundles. For each set of items, a sequen-
tial auction is held. This sequential auction is repeated over time, with probably
different items. When we evaluate our method by experiments, we assume the
auctions are first-price, that is, the highest bidder will receive the item for the
price bid.
Our main contribution is providing a method that first transforms this in-
formation into a data set, then learns models (in our case regression trees) for
predicting the revenue of orderings (Section 3.2), and finally uses a best-first
search algorithm in order to find a good ordering for a new set of items (Sec-
tion 3.3). Since we make few assumptions regarding the auction setting, our
method has a high potential to be used in practice. We implement an auction
simulator, develop three types of agents (in terms of their bidding strategies),
and design several (simple and complex) experiment settings, in order to test
the performance of the proposed learning method (Section 4). We compare this
performance with a random ordering strategy, a fixed ordering strategy, and a
simulated lower bound on the optimal ordering.
We now start with describing some existing work.
2 Related work
A few existing papers investigate the problem of how to maximize the seller’s
revenue by means of changing the ordering of items in sequential auctions. Mil-
grom and Weber [14] look at a setting where items are homogeneous and bidders
desire only one item. Elmaghraby [9] studies procurement auction where a buyer
outsources two heterogeneous jobs by sequential second-price auctions. He shows
that specific sequences lower procurement costs and identifies a class of suppliers’
cost functions where efficient orderings exist.
Pitchik [16] points out that in the presence of budget constraints, a sealed-bid
sequential auction with two bidders and two goods may have multiple symmet-
ric equilibrium bidding functions, and the ordering of sale affects the expected
revenue. If the bidder who wins the first good has a higher income than the other
one, the expected revenue is maximized.
Subramaniam and Venkatesh [20] investigate the optimal auctioning strategy
of a revenue-maximizing seller, who auctions two items, which could be comple-
ments or substitutes. They show that when the items are different in value, the
higher valued item (among the two) should be auctioned first in order to in-
crease the seller’s revenue. This conclusion is drawn based on a large number
of computer simulations with the assumption that bidders’ valuations are uni-
formly distributed. A similar revenue-maximizing strategy is proposed by Benoit
and Krishna [1] in a complete information common value auction setting. The
authors conclude that in such a setting, when selling two items to budget con-
strained bidders, it is always better to sell the more valued item first. However,
this strategy does not optimize the revenue anymore when more than two items
are to be auctioned.
Elkind and Fatima [8] study how to maximize revenue in sequential auctions
with second-price sealed-bid rules where homogenous bidders have unit demand.
In this setting, they analyze the equilibrium bids, and develop an efficient al-
gorithm that finds an optimal agenda (i.e., ordering). However, the problem of
selecting the optimal agenda becomes NP-complete if bidders’ valuations for the
same item can differ, even if each bidder’s value for each item is known, and all
bidders bid truthfully in each auction.
Empirical research has also been conducted to test the theoretical findings.
Grether et al. [13] report on a field experiment that tests the ordering strategies of
a seller in sequential, ascending automobile auctions. Several ordering strategies
such as high values first or low values first have been tested. They conclude that
the worst performing ordering in terms of revenue is for the seller to auction
vehicles from highest to lowest values. This result contradicts the conclusion
drawn from the theory of single time and single seller auctions. Raviv [18] uses
an example to demonstrate that there are cases where the ordering of the auction
does not affect revenue using a second price seal-bid auction. In his example,
there are two heterogeneous items for sale among three risk neutral bidders.
Raviv shows that when the ordering is randomized, the expected selling price
stays the same, no matter which one of the items is sold first.
In this paper, we adopt numerical experiments to investigate the influence of
ordering in sequential auctions instead of performing pure theoretical analysis.
However, unlike the work of [18] which tests pre-defined orderings, we build a
learning model that learns good orderings from the historical auctions.
We are not the first who consider learning from the previous auctions. Boutilier
et al. [3] propose a learning model for bidders to update their bidding policies in
sequential auctions for resources with complementarities. The bidding strategies
are computed based on the estimated distribution over prices, that is modeled
by dynamic programming. They show the emergence of interesting bidding be-
haviors by simulating simple resource allocation problems with 5 agents. Goes
et al. [12] present an empirical study of real sequential online auctions. They an-
alyze the data from an online auction retailer, and show that bidders learn and
update their willingness to pay in repeated auctions of the same item. In [15],
the authors show the benefits of using earlier auction data for the management
of sequential, multi-unit auctions, where the seller needs to split its entire in-
ventory into sequential auctions of smaller lots in order to increase its profit. In
their work, an auction feedback mechanism is developed based on a Bayesian
model, and it is used to update the auctioneer’s beliefs about the bidders’ valua-
tion distribution. The simulations were conducted with truth-telling agents. The
results show the feedback mechanism outperforms the naive fixed lot size policy.
Another interesting finding is that when there are many bidders, the relative
benefit of using the learning algorithm seems less important.
3 Learning good orderings
We aim to find a good ordering (with a high expected revenue) for a set of items
in an auction. The decision whether an ordering is good has to be determined
from historical data of the same auction, but possibly with different agents and
different (numbers of) items. A possible approach to tackle this problem would be
to learn the utility functions of the agents. We could then use these estimated
utility functions to try to find an ordering with high revenue. Although this
approach sounds sensible, we believe that it will fail in practice due to two
complexity issues:
1. Learning utility functions in combinatorial domains is hard [19], not to men-
tion learning one for every agent.
2. Given correctly learned utility functions, finding a good ordering in the se-
quential auction is still NP-complete [8].
In our approach, we try to circumvent these difficulties by making modeling
assumptions that simplify the learning problem, and by selecting learning targets
that makes finding a good ordering easier.
3.1 Auction setting and modeling assumptions
We assume there is a finite set of agents A. Let R = {r1, . . . , rl} denote the
collection of the item types, and the quantity of each item type can be more
than 1. When it is clear from the context, we will slightly abuse the notation and
use S = {r1, r2 . . . , r1, . . .} to denote the set of all available items. Each bidding
agent Ai has a valuation for each type of item or each bundle of different item
types vi : R → R+. We say that items r1, r2 ∈ R are complementary for agent
Ai if vi(r1) + vi(r2) < vi(r1 ∪ r2). In addition, each agent Ai ∈ A has a budget
constraint Bi on purchasing items.
In one round of auction, a set of items S with type set R′ ⊆ R will be
auctioned sequentially with an order that is announced before the auction starts.
For example, given item types r1 ∈ R and r2 ∈ R with quantities of 1 and 2
respectively, there are three possible orderings of items: (r1, r2, r2), (r2, r1, r2),
and (r2, r2, r1). The bidder agents are drawn from the pool of A. We assume
that the auction is repeated over time, and each auction sells possibly different
items S, with possibly different set of agents A′ ⊆ A.
We assume that auctions are conducted using Dutch auctions, where the
auctioneer starts with a high asking price which is lowered until some agent is
willing to accept the auctioneer’s price, and this agent will be awarded the item
for the last announced price.
At the end of each sequential auction, we have the following information at
our disposal: (1) the ordering of auctioned items; and (2) the revenue of each
sold item. Our goal of the sequential auction design is that given a set of items
r1, . . . , ri for sale, deciding the ordering of items such that the revenue collected
is maximized. We aim to find such a good ordering by learning from the previous
auctions. In order to simplify the learning problem, we make the following two
modeling assumptions.
Assumption 1 (Bidder independence) In every round of sequential auc-
tions, the set of participating bidders and their valuation functions are similar.
This assumption simplifies the problem of learning a good ordering. Instead of
learning the individual utility functions of agents, we can treat the agent popu-
lation as a single entity for which we need to find a single global utility function.
Such an approach will fail if the valuations of the agents are radically different
in every auction. However we consider this assumption sensible in many auction
settings. For instance, in the Dutch flower auction there can be different partic-
ipants every day, but it never occurs that one day people are only interested in
roses and the next day they only want tulips. Although the different participants
are interested in different item types, the interests of the group of participants
remain stable.
The first assumption effectively reduces the difficulty of the learning problem
to that of a standard machine learning setting: learn a single model from order-
ings and their rewards for predicting the expected reward for a given new input
ordering. Because we can now generalize over all bids instead of only the bids of
a single agent, the first assumption significantly increases the amount of avail-
able data. It is however still not straightforward how to apply machine learning
techniques, since there are many possible orderings and modeling the expected
revenue of every single one of them (using for instance a language model) will
require a lot of data. Therefore, we make another important assumption that
generalizes over different orderings in a sensible way:
Assumption 2 (Ordering independence) The expected revenue for an item
depends on which items were sold before and which items are still to be sold, but
not on their ordering.
This assumption represents our intuition on the amounts that agents will bid.
Suppose an agent A needs to buy an item ri, then the amount A is willing to
pay for ri depends on whether this is the last ri being sold in the auction, or
whether there are more to come. In another example, suppose A wants to buy ri
and rj , then the amount A bids for ri depends on whether A already obtained
rj , i.e., whether rj was auctioned before ri. In these examples, the exact ordering
of items before and after ri does not matter much for A’s valuation of ri. We
realize this assumption slightly overgeneralizes the auction setting since there
is a possibility that the ordering determines whether A could have obtained rj
before ri. However, since it greatly reduces the complexity of our models, and
thus also the amount of data required for learning, we gladly disregard this
possibility in our model.
3.2 Representing orderings
Given our two modeling assumptions, we need to find a suitable way to model
the expected revenues of such orderings. An ordering can be thought of as a
sequence of items. However, to the best of our knowledge none of the existing
sequence models fits our auction setting. Language models such as deterministic
automata [7] are too powerful since they do not require our second assumption.
Short sequence models such as hidden Markov models [2] do not model the
dependence on items sold a long time (more than the sliding window length)
before. What comes closest to our auction setting are models such as Markov
decision processes (MDPs) [17]. These directly model the expected revenue per
item, and we can build a state space that fits with our assumptions. However,
none of the models we know is capable of producing orderings of a given finite set
of items. This given set of items determines both the available actions (which
item to auction) and the goal state (when no items remain). Since this set is
rarely the same in different auctions, representing and learning the revenues
of auctions in an MDP is difficult. It is possible that with a suitable factored
representation of the states and/or function approximation [17] of the rewards,
we could represent our auctioning problem as an MDP. In fact, our method can
be seen as a pragmatic version of the MDP approach.
Instead of representing our problem with a sequence model such as an MDP,
we view the prediction of the revenue of an auction as a regression problem. Like
an MDP, we split this problem into the subproblems of predicting the revenue
of the auctioned items. We then sum these up to obtain the overall objective
function:
V (r1 . . . rn) =
∑
1≤k≤n
R(rk, {rj | j < k}, {rl | k < l})
where R(rk, J, L) is a regression function that determines the expected revenue of
rk given that J was auctioned before and L will be auctioned afterwards. These
objective and regression functions match with both of our modeling assump-
tions: it is independent of the participants and does not take the item ordering
into account. In addition, in contrast to the objective function typically used in
MDPs, ours is not recursive. This is possible because the set of items (available
actions in an MDP) is given beforehand. We use regression trees [4] as a regres-
sion function and train it using features based on the items auctioned before and
after the current item rk. Currently, we provide the following features:
Feature 1 For every item type rT , the amount of rT items already auctioned.
Feature 2 For every item type rT , the amount of rT items still to be auctioned.
Feature 3 For every pair of item types rT and rT ′ , the difference between the
amount of rT and rT ′ items already auctioned.
These features model the influence of utility functions with complementarities.
For instance, if many agents desire both rT and rT ′ types, and if the amount
of rT ′ items already auctioned is large when auctioning an rT item, then we
expect the revenue for this rT item to be high. Although the third feature can
be determined using the first, it is added for convenience of learning a decision
tree which requires many nodes to represent these values. The influence of budget
constraints are modeled only indirectly by these three features: once the amount
of rT items auctioned reaches a certain (to be learned) bound, we can expect all
agents that only want rT items to be out of budget. It could be better to model
this influence more directly by adding the following additional feature:
Feature 4 For every item type rT , the amount of revenue obtained from auc-
tioning rT items.
This feature models the influence of budget constraints much more directly.
However, since the auctioneer has to provide the ordering of an entire auction
before the auction starts, we can only use estimates on these amounts when
determining this order. For this we can use the predictions of the regression
model on the previously auctioned items. Although adding this feature could
improve the performance of the regression model, it also introduces the risk
of accumulating errors. Suppose the regression model incorrectly predicts the
revenue of one of the first items in the auction, then this value will be incorrectly
used in the fourth feature in later predictions. Hence, an incorrect prediction
potentially leads to a cascade of incorrect predictions. In our experiments, we
use regression trees learned with and without using this feature for the purpose
of comparison.
Below we give an example of how an ordering and its obtained revenues is
transformed into a data set using these 4 types of features.
Table 1. The data set created from the auction data in Example 3.
Type Revenue A before A after B before B after A¿B Sum A Sum B
(Feature 1) (Feature 2) (Feature 1) (Feature 2) (Feature 3) (Feature 4) (Feature 4)
A 10 0 3 0 4 0 0 0
A 8 1 2 0 4 1 10 0
B 4 2 2 0 3 2 18 0
A 8 2 1 1 3 1 18 4
B 6 3 1 1 2 2 26 4
B 3 3 1 2 1 1 26 10
B 3 3 1 3 0 0 26 13
A 14 3 0 4 0 -1 26 16
Example 3. Suppose that a set of item A and a set of item B are being auctioned
using the ordering AABABBBA, and that the revenues of the items obtained
in the auction are in order: 10,8,4,8,6,3,3,14. For every item-revenue pair in this
auction we create one row in the data set with values for all the features described
above. The data set is shown in Table 1.
A data set obtained in this way can be given as input to any standard regres-
sion method from machine learning. In our case, we learn a regression tree for
every item type using recursive partitioning techniques [5]. The result is a set
of predictive models for the expected revenue of items, and by summing these
revenues we obtain the expected revenue of an auction.
Algorithm 1 Computing a good ordering
Require: A set of items S, historical data on orderings and their revenues D, a max-
imum number of iterations m
Ensure: Returned is a good (high expected revenue) ordering
Transform D into a data set
for every item type rT do
Learn a regression model from D for predicting the revenue of item type rT
end for
Initialize a hashtable H and a priority queue Q
Add the empty data row to Q
while Q is not empty and the size of H is less than m do
Pop the row of features F with highest value v from Q
if H does not contain F with a value ≥ v then
Add F with value v to H
Let L be the set of remaining items in F
for every item type rT of items in L do
Let ik be an item of Type rT in L
Let L′ be a random ordering of L− ik
Use the learned models to evaluate the value v′ of auctioning the ordering
ikL
′ after F
Create new features F ′ for auctioning ik after F
Add F ′ to Q with value v + v′
end for
end if
end while
return The highest evaluated ordering
3.3 Computing an ordering
Given the predictive model for the expected revenue per item, it is not yet
straightforward to compute a good ordering. For a given ordering, we can gen-
erate a data set, predict the individual revenues of items using the regression
model, and sum these up to obtain the revenue of the ordering. However, testing
all possible orderings and choosing the one with the highest expected revenue is
impossible due to the huge amount of possible orderings. The traditional method
to overcome this computational blowup in MDPs is to use a dynamic program-
ming method. Although this lessens the computational load by combining the
different paths that lead to the same sets of auctioned items, the search space is
still too large and waiting for a solution will take too long (especially if the fourth
feature is being used). Instead, we therefore employ a best-first search strategy
that can be terminated at anytime in order to return the best found solution so
far. We show how this best-first search strategy works in Algorithm 1.
The algorithm uses a hashtable and a priority queue. The hashtable is used
to exclude the possibility of visiting the same nodes twice if the obtained rev-
enue is less than before (just like a dynamic programming method). The priority
queue provides promising candidate nodes for the best-first strategy. By comput-
ing random orderings of the remaining items, the learned models can evaluate
complete orderings of all items. The best one found is stored and returned if
the algorithm is terminated. Unfortunately, this does not result in an admissi-
ble heuristic for an A* search procedure. Hence, even if the algorithm pops a
solution from the queue, this is not necessarily optimal. In our experience, using
random orderings of the remaining items in this heuristic provides a good spread
over the search space. Although some nodes can be ‘unlucky’ and obtain a bad
ordering of the remaining items, there are always multiple ways to reach nodes
in the search space and it is very unlikely that all possibilities will be ‘unlucky’.
4 Experiments
In order to test our method in a bit more realistic auction settings, we developed
an auction simulator and created three types of agents who have different bidding
strategies. We then use the simulator to generate different auctions to see how
our method performs in various auction settings.
4.1 Auction simulator
We created an auction simulator of a Dutch auction (i.e., first-price descending
auction). Since the outcome of an auction is influenced by the bidding strategies
of the agents, we simulate three different types of agents in auctions: myopic,
smart, and simulator agents.
– The myopic agents bid as soon as the asking price reaches their true value.
This true value is determined by partitioning the set of items that are in
the agent’s possession over the agents types and bundles such that the sum
of their values is maximized. This difference in this value before and after
adding the current item to the agent’s possessions is the agent’s true value.
If multiple agents have the same true value, one of these is selected as winner
uniformly at random.
– The smart agents know all the valuation functions of all agents and bid as
soon as the asking price is less or equal to their true value and at most one
greater than the true value of all other agents.
– The simulator agents have access to the auction simulator. They bid what the
smart agents bid, only if a run of the simulator results in a higher utility (i.e.,
the total value of obtained items plus the remaining budget) when placing
this bid than when not. In addition, the simulator agents will overbid their
true value if this gives them higher utility at the end of the auction, due to
for example being rewarded the complementary items.
Intuitively, the myopic agents are truth-telling agents. The smart agents rep-
resent agents (for example those in [3]) that have succeeded in learning the value
that will be placed for the current item. The simulator agents represent agents
that have truly learned to optimize their utility. They are able to determine
for every bid value exactly what their final utility will be. Of course, it is very
unlikely that agents will be able to predict these values perfectly in practice.
However, since such a prediction capability is the goal of learning, experiments
with these agents will show how our method performs in the presence of good
learning agents.
Using this simulator we generated data sets (orderings of item-revenue pairs)
and tested whether our method was able to learn good orderings in the presence
of these three types of agents. We now explain how we generated a small auction
that consists of 8 agents bidding for 4 item types.
Generating small auctions We initialize the auction simulator using a given
set of items R. We assign every type in R an average value of 10, 15, 20, or 25.
Every possible value is assigned exactly once to a type. Every type has a random
popularity (probability of being desired by an agent). In addition, every pair of
types is assigned a pair probability of being desired as complementary items by
an agent. This probability is either 0.0, 0.5, or 1.0 for every pair, decided at
random. Thus in some auction settings it is possible that the expensive items
are popular and always complementary to less expensive unpopular items, while
in other settings, cheap items are popular but never complementary. In every
auction, there are 2 to 5 items of every type being auctioned, decided at random.
Every agent is generated at random using the same scheme. They receive
a random budget between 30 and 60. It selects at most 3 desired item types.
Popular types have a higher probability of being selected. Every desired item
type is assigned a value drawn uniformly at random with its average price as
mean and a range of 11. At most two pairs of desired types are combined into a
complementary pair based on the pair probabilities. These get assigned a value
equal to the sum of the values of the individual types multiplied by 2. If necessary,
the budget of the agent is increased to match this value.
Using this generating scheme, we obtain a diverse set of agents, but with
similar preferences. The following is for example a set of agents generated for
the experiments with four item types A,B,C,D:
budget=58 v(C)=12 v(D)=14 v(B)=17 v(CD)=52 v(BC)=58
budget=78 v(B)=16 v(D)=15 v(A)=23 v(AB)=78 v(BD)=62
budget=64 v(B)=20 v(C)=12 v(BC)=64
budget=70 v(D)=11 v(B)=17 v(C)=18 v(BD)=56 v(BC)=70
budget=38 v(D)=7 v(C)=12 v(CD)=38
budget=66 v(B)=19 v(C)=14 v(BC)=66
budget=42 v(C)=17
budget=66 v(A)=23 v(D)=10 v(AD)=66
In this list, every row is an agent where its budget and valuations are indicated.
Although the set of agents is small and their preferences are similar, it is not
immediately clear what the outcome of an auction would be, even for myopic
agents. For example, the following three randomly generated auctions demon-
strate the variance of winning bids for different item types when the bidders are
myopic.
(D,15)(B,47)(D,15)(C,18)(C,18)(C,18)(A,23)(D,43)(B,20)
(A,0)(A,0)(D,14)(D,14)
(D,15)(A,23)(A,23)(A,23)(A,23)(D,15)(A,0)(B,20)(C,44)
(C,18)(B,52)(D,14)
(A,23)(D,43)(B,20)(C,44)(D,15)(B,47)(D,15)(A,0)(B,19)
(C,47)(C,18)(C,18)(D,14)(B,17)
Generating complex auctions We also used this generator for generating a setting
with 30 smart agents, of which 25 participate in a round of sequential auction
and bid for 8 types of items. The main change of the generator for this complex
setting is an increase of the maximum amount of generated items from 5 to 10.
In addition, every average price is now assigned to every item exactly twice and
we also bound the number of popular items. Overall, this results in larger and
more complex auctions.
Our main goal is to learn models that uncover the hidden structure underly-
ing the winning bids in these auctions. We then use these models in order to find
a high revenue ordering for a new set of items. In the next section, we describe
the methods we use to test the quality of this ordering.
4.2 Experimental setup
We evaluate the performance of our method using the auction simulator. We
first generate a set of agents, and run simulations of 250 random orderings of
randomly selected items (2 to 5 of every type in the small auction). These 250
orderings and their obtained revenues are transformed to a data set as shown in
Section 3.2 and provided to the regression tree learner. We use an implementa-
tion of regression trees from the Orange data mining toolbox3 in Python. The
resulting models are used to provide an ordering for a new set of randomly gen-
erated items using Algorithm 1 with a maximum number of 1000 iterations. We
then run 10 simulations of this ordering and average the resulting revenues. The
last two steps are performed for 25 different random sets of items. The resulting
average revenues are again averaged. We use this average revenue of different
sets of items for the learned ordering method as a performance indicator. This
whole procedure is repeated 5 times in order to test for different sets of agents.
For the complex setting, it is repeated 10 times.
We test two implementations of our method: one with Feature 4 (See Sec-
tion 3.2), and one without. Moreover, we compare them with two ordering strate-
gies: (i) a random ordering, and (ii) a fixed ordering suggested by the litera-
ture [20, 1]: auction the most valuable item first. In addition, we include a lower
bound on the average revenue of an optimal ordering. This is computed by run-
ning simulations of 250 random orderings and selecting the one with the highest
revenue.
4.3 Results
In this section, we first describe the results obtained on the small auction settings
with 8 myopic, smart, and simulator agents. Afterwards, we show the results
3 http://orange.biolab.si/doc/
obtained on the larger complex setting of 30 smart agents, of which 25 participate
in every auction.
Small auction setting Table 2 shows the values of the performance indicator
(mean revenue for a random set of items) obtained using each of the random
(random) and fixed orderings (most valuable first), the two implementations of
our method (best first with sum and best first), and a lower bound on an optimal
ordering (best auction found).
Table 2. The performance of ordering methods with 8 myopic agents.
ordering strategy 1 2 3 4 5 sum
random 192 252 216 246 230 1136
most valuable first 176 214 184 251 223 1048
best first 204 247 225 245 229 1150
best first with sum 196 243 232 249 231 1151
best auction found 208 284 235 255 232 1214
There are 5 sets of values, one for each repetition of the experiment. These
values are summed up to obtain the overall performance of all methods. Clearly,
the lower bound method performs best, followed by our methods, the random
ordering, and finally the fixed ordering.
The result that selling the most valuable item first gives the worst perfor-
mance agrees with the empirical work of [13], although it contradicts the existing
theoretical findings [20, 1] where much simpler settings are considered.
Surprisingly the differences between our methods and the random ordering
strategy is very small and not significant. In fact, the mean values for a single
repetition are significantly different (typically) only if their difference is greater
than 25. This holds for neither the difference between our methods and the
random strategy, nor the difference between our methods and the lower bound
of the optimal ordering (i.e., best auction found). Our methods do significantly
outperform the most valuable first strategy.
Table 3. The performance of ordering methods with 8 smart agents.
ordering strategy 1 2 3 4 5 sum
random 260 237 231 158 262 1148
most valuable first 259 235 223 180 253 1150
best first 269 242 235 172 264 1182
best first with sum 269 228 232 176 266 1171
best auction found 278 259 237 183 279 1236
We conducted another set of auctions with 8 smart agents and the results
are shown in Table 3. The main conclusion that we draw from these results is
that ordering does matter: the best ordering found in 250 random orderings does
outperform the other methods. Our methods perform better than the random
strategy and the fixed ordering strategy, but not significantly.
Table 4. The performance of ordering methods with 8 simulator agents.
ordering strategy 1 2 3 4 5 sum
random 225 183 203 225 192 1028
most valuable first 212 182 204 225 180 1003
best first 240 181 209 234 193 1057
best first with sum 237 181 211 234 194 1057
best auction found 239 191 216 323 197 1166
Finally, with the simulator agents (Table 4), our methods outperform the
most valuable first method significantly. However the performance increase be-
tween our methods and the random one is not significant. The lower bound does
provide a significant difference compared to all the other methods, showing that
even in the presence of very intelligent agents, ordering the items in a good way
can really benefit the collected revenue.
Complex auction setting We now show the results obtained on the larger complex
setting of 30 smart agents, of which 25 participate in every auction (Table 5).
There are 8 different types of items and 2 to 10 of them are auctioned in ev-
ery sequential auction. The results confirm again that ordering items according
to their values performs worst in our auction setting and that the regression
trees are able to produce better orderings than random orderings. In fact, the
difference between the best first method with the sum information performs sig-
nificantly better than random. This is surprising since we expected that this
method would be troubled by the possibility of cascading errors (see Section 3),
especially when many items are being auctioned.
Table 5. The performance of ordering methods with 25 smart agents.
ordering strategy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 sum
random 1068 1121 1037 1206 1143 876 991 849 822 1138 10251
most valuable first 959 1075 1048 1154 1148 879 1073 896 907 1059 10198
best first 1062 1149 1072 1198 1107 885 1019 882 836 1161 10371
best first with sum 1115 1156 1062 1219 1137 872 1029 901 815 1125 10431
best auction found 1115 1163 1097 1263 1163 937 1050 918 862 1199 10767
Our preliminary results are encouraging as they show that our method is
able to learn a good ordering for a complex auction setting from a small amount
of examples (250 historical orderings along with their revenues). In addition,
surprisingly they show that a random ordering strategy also performs well in
complex auction settings. This is counter-intuitive. Further investigations (the-
oretical and empirical analysis) are required to explain this result.
5 Conclusions
The ordering of auctions plays an important role in the total revenue collected
by the auctioneer in sequential auctions. This is true especially with budget
constrained bidders and the presence of complementarities among items which
occur often in real-world auctions.
In this paper, we propose a novel method to find a good ordering. We show
how historical auction data can be transformed into a data set for learning models
(in our case regression trees) that predict the expected revenue of orderings for
new auctions. We then provide best-first search based methods that find a good
ordering for a new set of items from the learned models. We develop an auction
simulator to generate simple and complex auction settings. Three types of agents
participate in the auctions: myopic, smart, and simulator agents. We compare
the performance of the proposed methods with different ordering strategies.
The experimental results are interesting: our method is able to learn the in-
fluences of budget limits and complementary items on the total revenue, and
to learn the good ordering with high expected revenue. However, surprisingly
the random ordering strategy also works well in most test cases. This contra-
dicts intuition drawn from the existing theoretical results [9]. We are currently
investigating when the benefit of using the learning method is important or
unimportant in sequential auction setting.
Compared to existing work on revenue maximization in auctions, our method
requires much fewer assumptions regarding the auction setting, the types of
bidders, and their valuations. As long as there exists historical data, and the
bidders do not change radically, our method can be applied. We are therefore
very interested to test our method on real data in the near future.
Our assumptions of ordering and bidder independence make it possible to use
standard machine learning models in order to quickly learn the hidden structure
of a good ordering. In the future, we would like to investigate whether these
assumptions can be relaxed and what the effect will be on the learning perfor-
mance. In addition, we are investigating whether our problem can be modeled
and solved by an MDP. This is not straightforward due to the given set of items
in an auction, which will rarely be the same in different auctions, and the fact
that an ordering has to be provided before the auction starts. We also plan to
test different regression methods.
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